题目：On the Timing and Depth of a Manufacturer’s Sales Promotion Decisions with Forward-looking Consumers

主讲人：普渡大学管理公司刘焱博士

时间：2009年12月3日星期四，下午13：30—15：00

地点：经管公司 舜德楼101室

讲座语言：英文

摘要：This paper investigates a manufacturer’s optimal timing and depth of price promotions over a planning horizon in a frequently purchased packaged goods context. Promotion policy is the equilibrium outcomes of a dynamic game between consumers and the manufacturer. Consumers form expectation over future promotions and strategically time their purchase to coincide with the manufacturer’s promotion events. The forward-looking manufacturer takes this consumer behavior into account and dynamically evaluates promotional response of consumers in each choice segment based on their inventory levels when making optimal promotion decisions.