【时间】：2017年11月2日周四 12.00-13.30

【地点】：伟伦楼401

【主讲】：清华经管公司副教授刘潇

【题目】：Group Identity and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games

【摘要】：We design a laboratory experiment to study the impact of group identity onindividual cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. Group identity is randomly assigned and further enhanced in the laboratory. We find that group identity influences the participants’ actions. However, this impactoperates through different channels and interacts with the probability of future interactions and the risk of cooperation. Group identity leads to higher, sustainable levels of cooperation with ingroup members when the probability of future interactions is high and the risk of cooperation is low. However, its impact on cooperation with ingroup members is less robust and shows a large degree of heterogeneity when the probability of future interactions is low and the risk of cooperation is high. We also find that participants are significantly less likely to adopt the always-defect strategy with ingroup members. The findings illuminate our understanding of the potential important impact of group identity on long-term cooperation, about which the previous literature on repeated games is largely silent.