• kaiyun体育登录网页入口
  • 经管公司
  • 用户登录
  • 经管邮箱
  • EN

崔海涛,明尼苏达大学卡尔森管理公司教授:The Blessing of Bounded Rationality in Distribution Channels

2021年09月13日 00:00
阅读:

【Speaker】Cui Haitao, Professor,University of Minnesota-Carlson School of Management

【Time】Tuesday, Sep. 14, 2021, 10:30-12:00

【Venue】Room 453, Weilun Building, Tsinghua SEM

【Language】English

【Organizer】Department of Management Science and Engineering

【Topic】An Analysis on Trends of Scholar Cooperation and Evolutions of Research Topics in Behavioral Operations Management

【Abstract】In this paper, authors' cooperation and network relationships in the field of Behavioral Operations Management (BOM) are examined. Research articles in BOM that were published in five UTD 24 journals from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2020 were analyzed.

Through the statistical analysis of authors’ collaborative network and the evaluation of authors’ co-authorship network of the collected articles, we find that there is an increasing trend in the number of scholars, the number of cooperation among scholars, the diversity of cooperation among scholars and their institutions, and the width of research topics with the growth of time. In addition, through co-word analysis, BOM topics in the literature are analyzed to investigate potential popular research topics in the future.

【Topic】The Blessing of Bounded Rationality in Distribution Channels

【Abstract】The extensive adoption of cost-plus pricing by retailers in distribution channels is a puzzling phenomenon, considering the fact that retailers can improve their profits by best-responding to the wholesale prices announced by their suppliers/manufacturers. In contrast to a dyadic channel with full rationality, where the best response pricing is optimal for the retailer and a deadweight loss is incurred, we find that a simple costplus pricing can be a blessing if the retailer is boundedly rational. More interestingly, we characterize the conditions under which all channel members, including the retailer, can benefit from the cost-plus pricing. Such a result is robust when either the manufacturer or the retailer is the Stackelberg leader in a dyadic channel, and when the setting involves multiple, competing retailers. Thus, the cost-plus pricing practice driven by retailers’ bounded rationality serves as a natural mechanism by which firms engage in decisions that help alleviate double-marginalization and benefit both the manufacturer and the retailer.

最新动态