【主讲】华盛顿大学助理教授Shi Chen

【题目】通过非政府组织监督，供应链透明度对可持续发展的影响

【时间】2015年12月14日（周一）下午1:30-3:30

【地点】清华经管公司伟伦楼453

【语言】英文

【主办】管理科学与工程系

【简历】Shi Chen老师的简历

Shi Chen is an Assistant Professor of Operations Management at the University of Washington Foster School of Business. His research focuses on incentive and coordination issues in supply chain management and his areas of specialization include inventory modeling, project management – supply chain management interface, and socially and environmentally sustainable supply chains. His research works has been accepted or under review at Management Science, Operations Research, and Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. Prior to joining the Foster School of Business, he received a B.E. (2006) and a M.S. (2008) from Industrial Engineering Department of Tsinghua University, and received a Ph.D. (2013) from the Management Science & Engineering Department of Stanford University.

Shi Chen，Assistant Professor，University of Washington Foster School of Business:Impact of Supply Chain Transparency on Sustainability via NGO Scrutiny

【Speaker】Shi Chen，Assistant Professor，University of Washington Foster School of Business

【Title】Impact of Supply Chain Transparency on Sustainability via NGO Scrutiny

【Time】Dec.14 (Monday), 13:30-15:30

【Venue】Room 453, Weilun Building, Tsinghua SEM

【Language】English

【Organizer】Department of Management Science and Engineering

【Abstract】Companies are increasingly held accountable for social and environmental violations of their suppliers in emerging economies. Buyers’ auditing and independent auditing by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are important tools in addressing supply chain sustainability issues. In this paper we study the potential use of supply chain transparency as another effective tool: whether the buyer should reveal her supplier list, knowing that identified suppliers face a different level of NGO scrutiny than the unidentified ones. We incorporate the strategic interactions among a buyer, her suppliers, and the NGOs. We characterize their equilibrium actions and find conditions under which the buyer finds it beneficial to reveal her supplier list, and discover different reasons for the buyer to do so. We find that supply chain transparency -- either the buyer's voluntary revelation of her supplier list, or government's mandate for the buyer to disclose violations -- can lead to better supply chain sustainability, but we also find the possibility that more transparency may lead to lower sustainability. Our heterogeneous-supplier model also suggests that there exists a positive network externality among a buyer's supplier base, such that investment in sustainability capability by one supplier makes it more attractive for the other suppliers to invest.