【主讲】杜克大学副教授孙彭

【题目】促使环境危害披露：一个动态机制设计方法

【时间】2015年3月18日（周三）15.00-17.00

【地点】清华经管公司伟伦楼407

【语言】英文

【主办】管理科学与工程系

【摘要】This paper studies the design of voluntary disclosure regulations for afirm that faces a stochastic environmental hazard. The occurrence ofsuch a hazard is known only to the firm, and the firm has an incentiveto conceal the information.The regulator may inspect the firm at anytime to uncover the hazard. Because inspections are costly, theregulator also offers a reward to the firm for voluntarily disclosingthe hazard.Thus, the regulator needs to dynamically determine thereward and inspection policy that minimizes the long-run expected discounted societal cost.We model this problem as a dynamic adverseselection problem with costly state verification in continuous time.Despite the complexity and generality of this set-up, we show that theoptimal regulation policy is very simple, and we fully characterize itsstructure in closed form. Specifically, the optimal policy follows acyclic structure alternating between reward and inspection periods.During a reward period, the reward level decreases over time.When thereward reaches a certain low level, an inspection should occur eitherafter a random time period or right away, depending on whether theinspection accuracy is sufficiently high (i.e. above a threshold).Ifthe inspection does not reveal a hazard, the reward level is reset to ahigh level, which restarts the cycle.Overall, these results indicatethat the use of rewards should always be exhausted before resorting toan inspection, and the results highlight the critical role of inspectionaccuracy.Furthermore, our analysis reveals that the optimal inspectionfrequency increases with the non-disclosure penalty when inspectionaccuracy is low.

【简历】杜克大学副教授孙彭的简历