【主讲】麦克马斯特大学副教授吴如海

【题目】一个卖家操纵顾客评论的竞争模型

【时间】2015年5月21日（周四）15.30-17.30

【地点】清华经管公司伟伦楼407

【语言】英文

【摘要】Consumer ratings provided in online marketplaces not only help potential consumers learn about the quality of sellers’products andservices, but also shape the competition among those sellers. Some sellers, taking the advantage of anonymity of contributingconsumers, forge consumer reviews to boost their own ratings. This research uses a game theoretical model to explore the incentivemechanism of the manipulation of consumer reviews in a competitive environment. By examining the interaction between pricecompetition and review manipulation, this paper answers the following questions: Who manipulates online consumer reviews, and whodoes not?How does such manipulation influence the ranking of the perceived quality of the sellers?What factors contribute to thedegree of consumer review manipulation? And, how does the propensity of consumers’contribution to reviews affect such amanipulation?Our model shows that although forging consumer reviews can improve their perceived quality, high-quality sellers donot do so because they incur higher marginal costs. Only low-quality sellers fake consumer reviews. However, the manipulation ofconsumer ratings does not change the rankings of the perceived quality of sellers. This paper also shows how market characteristics,including consumer quality preference, manipulation cost, and marketplace commission fee influence the manipulation of consumerreviews.Interestingly, this paper also finds that when dissatisfied consumers are more likely to voice their options than wouldsatisfied consumers, sellers engage less manipulation of consumer reviews.

【简历】吴如海老师的简历